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Abstract
In this paper we consider a vertically differentiated duopoly model in which a green producer
competes with a brown rival in a market in which consumers are environmentally concerned. In
particular, consumers are assumed to value not only the intrinsic quality of a certain product, but
also its environmental impact. This environmental valuation has a positional content: consumers
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we consider the choice of the green firm between cleaner and end-of-pipe abatement efforts. We
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1 Introduction
Recent years have shown a growing interest for environmental issues all over the planet. Due to
mass-media and informative campaigns by local governments, people have become increasingly
concerned with the impact of their consumption choices on the ecosystem in which they live. This
may be driven by personal motivations, as people realize that looking after the environment affects
their standard of living (Heffner et al., 2007; Carlsson et al.; 2010, Deltas et al. 2013). Yet, another
strand of the literature points out that social and moral motivations represent the main drivers
to green consumption (Brekke et al., 2003; Nyborg et al., 2006; Manner and Gowdy, 2010). In
this view, people feel that they comply with a social norm when they buy green products. Green
consumers receive therefore some degree of social approval, and this may increase their level of
integration in a society (Ostrom, 2000). Conversely, consumers may incur a sort of social stigma
when they buy brown products.
The green content of social norms usually differs according to a country’s cultural orientation
as well as the intergenerational transmission from parents to children (Litina et al., 2016). For this
reason, a consumer’s environmental concern is often country-specific. Producers may then decide
to adjust their environmental technological efforts to the socio-economic conditions of the market
that they confront. Toyota, for example, offers a wide range of vehicles, and some of them are
characterized by a prominent effort in reducing polluting emissions. Apart from the popular Prius
hybrid and plug-in hybrid models, Toyota is also making significant investments in small electric
vehicles as well as larger hydrogen fuel cell commercial vehicles. Toyota’s segmentation strategy is
driven by its philosophy of marketing the "right car in the right place". Toyota’s Corolla sedan car
is designed for drivers who are looking for a prestigious car, whereas the aforementioned Toyota
Prius targets more environmentally concerned drivers. Case in point, Corolla is more popular in
Thailand than in Japan and in the U.S., as in the latter countries environmental sensitivity is
growing and hybrid vehicles are receiving increasing attention. However, also in those markets
where consumers have not yet developed an environmental conscience, Toyota has to cope with
new challenges coming from environmental regulations, which often require to sustain some costs
in order to reduce the pollution emissions level of its vehicles.
It follows that green technological efforts usually differ, depending on whether the producer aims
at capturing consumers’ environmental concern, or if it simply must satisfy a tighter environmental
regulation. We want to investigate whether a firm that wants to "go green" is more willing to invest
in cleaner production rather than in end-of-pipe technologies in the presence of social incentives
to pro-environmental behavior. Many authors have pointed out that, although both abatement
efforts enable a firm to comply with a given environmental regulation, cleaner or "beginning-of-
the-pipe" technologies are usually preferable to "end-of-pipe" or "end-of-the-pipe" technologies for
both environmental and economic reasons (Frondel et al., 2007; Requate, 2005). Indeed, while
the former technologies reduce pollution emissions at the source since they entail a change in the
production process, the latter ones are simply add-on measures that curb emissions at the end of the
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production process.1 This explains why the cost related to cleaner production is usually assumed to
be variable in the quantity produced, whereas with an end-of-the-pipe investment technologies, the
cost is assumed to be fixed (Clemenz, 2010; Nicolaï and Meunier, 2014). More precisely, the cleaner
the technology is, the lower the per-unit of output emissions but the higher the marginal production
costs are. On the contrary, in the case of end-of-pipe technologies, some fraction of the pollutant
is reduced without changing the production process. For this reason, although both technologies
require (at least in the short run) an increase of the production costs, cleaner technologies could
potentially improve the production process in the long run.2
Understanding the driving factors that affect firms’ propensity to implement one technology in-
stead of the other one represents therefore a relevant research question. While most of the literature
focuses on the impact of different forms of environmental regulation, we depart from this approach
and focus on the interplay between the respective costs of the two different green technologies, the
intensity of market competition and the degree of consumers’ environmental concern.
1.1 Our modeling framework
In order to formally address our research issue, we consider a duopoly market with two firms each
providing a vertically differentiated good to a population of consumers. The intrinsic functionality
of a product determines its hedonic quality so that the high quality variant is characterized by a
better performance. Nonetheless, the high quality variant has very high emissions. Accordingly,
it is more polluting than the low quality alternative. The green (but low hedonic quality) variant
can be produced by using either a cleaner technology (i.e. incurring a variable cost) or end-of-pipe
measures (i.e. incurring a fixed cost).
It follows that, building on Mantovani et al. (2016), we restrict our attention to the case in which
consumers face a trade-off between the intrinsic performance of a product and its environmental
impact. Most electric or hybrid vehicles, although characterized by a lower environmental impact,
are still less performant than conventional internal combustion engine vehicles in terms of speed
and overall driving experience. However, consumers may receive some additional benefit from the
less polluting vehicle if there exists a sufficiently strong pro-environmental social norm ingrained
in the society. On this point, we are very close to the literature on impure altruism as a source
of pro-social behavior (Andreoni, 1988 and 1990). Indeed, we argue that consumers experience
positive feelings from green behavior as they believe they "are doing the right thing".
Furthermore, since the contribution to the environment is socially more valuable in a highly
polluted community, we assume that the social benefit deriving from green consumption depends
on the comparison between the emissions released by the green product and those released by the
1A similar distinction is often labelled as abatement versus replacement technologies. Abatement technology refers
to the reduction of polluting emissions for a given production technology, while replacement technology implies a
substitution of the brown technology with the green technology.
2Typical examples of end-of-pipe technologies are catalytic convertors on automobile tailpipes that reduce pollutant
emissions after they have formed, whereas examples of cleaner production technologies are the use of environmentally
friendly materials (e.g. replacing organic solvents by water) and modification of the combustion chamber design
(process-integrated systems).
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brown alternative. Symmetrically, the more polluting the product chosen by an individual is in
comparison with the green alternative, the stronger the social condemn.3 Hence, in our model,
the relative position of a product on the environmental quality ladder defines the relative position
of a consumer on the social ladder. We capture the social dimension of consumption in the form
of relative preferences in which the satisfaction of a consumer is also determined by the difference
between the personal status and the status of the others (Akerlof, 1997; Alexopoulos and Sapp,
2006; Reichmann, 2006).4 In this setting, we investigate how the choice between cleaner and end-
of-pipe technologies is solved by the green (but low hedonic-quality) firm, given the relative cost
entailed by each type of abatement effort.
It is worth remarking that we disregard the uncertainty that often affects R&D activity, in
this case related to the green technology. We acknowledge that this is a relevant issue, which has
attracted a limited but significant number of contributions, such as Denicolò (1999), Montero (2011)
and Scotchmer (2011). These authors consider stochastic models with replacement technologies
that are affected by different environmental policies, and are characterized by an explicit trade-off
between static and dynamic efficiency. However, this would go beyond the scope of our analysis,
as it would imply introducing a time dimension. Furthermore, it would depart from the main idea
motivating our paper, namely the effects of pro-environmental behavior and income inequality on
how to go green.
1.2 Our main results
We find that in extreme cases, i.e. when the cost difference unambiguously favors one technology
versus the other, then the firm opts for the cheaper solution. For example, if the marginal cost
required by cleaner technology is comparatively much higher than the fixed cost required by end-
of-pipe technology, then the latter always prevails. This is rather obvious given the assumptions of
the model.
Instead, our analysis provides interesting results when the cost difference is intermediate. In
this case, the solution to the conflict between green technologies is related to the willingness to pay
(WTP henceforth) for quality, which depends on both the consumer’s degree of green awareness
and her average income.5 In particular, we find that for high (resp. low) level of income, the
investment in cleaner technologies (resp. end-of-pipe) is unambiguously preferred over end-of-pipe
(resp. cleaner technologies). For intermediate values of income, whenever the emissions gap between
the variants is low (resp. high), then investing in cleaner can be observed only in the uncovered
(resp. covered) market.
3Since the conspicuous consumption theory developed by Veblen (1899), consumers are willing to pay a higher price
for a functionally equivalent good in order to reveal their wealth, their social status or other specific characteristics.
4 In his pioneering paper, Akerlof (1997) stated that the satisfaction of a consumer increases with the difference
between the personal status and the status of the others. Alexopoulos and Sapp (2006) and Reichmann (2006)
analyze relative preferences from the point of view of firms. These preferences are also known as "other-regarding
preferences".
5On the relationship between inequality and green consumerism, see the seminal paper by Boyce (1994), along
with following contributions by Magnani (2000), Vona and Patriarca (2010), and Pfaaf et al. (2004), inter alia.
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The rationale underlying this result is as follows. When facing the choice between investing in
cleaner vs. end-of-pipe technologies, the green firm takes into account two drivers: a price compe-
tition driver and a social driver. These two drivers have to be examined by considering the basic
difference between these two abatement efforts. In particular, while investing in cleaner technolo-
gies implies a variable cost disadvantage which in turn increases the price charged at equilibrium,
end-of-pipe measures do not directly affect the equilibrium price since the fixed cost does not en-
ter into the firm’s maximization process. Accordingly, cleaner technology can be preferred over
end-of-pipe as long as the firm can benefit from a high WTP, that can be considered increasing
with income (see Tirole, 1988, page 96). On the one hand, the price competition driver discourages
the investment in cleaner technology given that equilibrium prices decrease with the intensity of
market competition. On the other hand, the social driver acts in an opposite sense as it increases
the WTP for the green good.
We find that the price competition driver dominates for high values of WTP for intrinsic hedonic
quality, regardless of the market coverage, thus explaining why end-of-pipe technology prevails
for low values of income, whereas cleaner production prevails for high values of income. This
is consistent with recent findings. Frondel et al. (2007), for example, find a clear dominance
of cleaner production in seven OECD developed countries (Canada, France, Germany, Hungary,
Japan, Norway, and the U.S.).
For intermediate values of income, the balance of these contrasting drivers is ambiguous. The
social driver is stronger the larger the social component of consumption is, namely the higher is the
intensity of the relative preferences and/or the higher is the emissions gap. The competition driver
is more significant in a covered market where the equilibrium market shares react more strongly
to a price change than in the uncovered market. Since full market coverage is reached thanks to
high enough values of the intensity of social preferences, it follows that, on one hand competition
is tougher, but on the other hand, the social component of consumption is more important in
the covered than in the uncovered market. Thus, the choice between cleaner and end-of-pipe
technologies depends on whether the competition driver — inducing the green firm to invest in cleaner
technologies in the uncovered market — dominates (or is dominated by) the social driver, leading
the green firm to undertake this investment in the covered market. Whenever the emissions gap is
not very relevant, the competition driver prevails so that the green firm undertakes an investment
in cleaner technologies in the uncovered market, while it opts for end-of-pipe technologies under
market coverage. On the contrary, when the emissions gap is relevant, the social driver prevails so
the investment in cleaner technologies takes place only in the covered market where the increase
in price due to the variable cost does not penalize significantly the green firm in terms of market
share.
It is worth remarking that a low emissions gap can be considered as a small environmental
innovation, that is, the environmentally friendly firm is unable to substantially differentiate its
variant with respect to the brown good. In this case, it is therefore preferable to invest in cleaner
production only in an uncovered market where competition is milder than in a covered one.
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The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we provide the literature review. In Section
3 we outline the formal model and derive demand functions. In Section 4 we develop the equilibrium
analysis for both cleaner and end-of-pipe technologies. In Section 5 we compare these two green
technologies and provide economic and managerial intuition to explain the firm’s decision. Section
6 concludes the paper.
2 Related Literature
Our paper mainly contributes to two different strands of literature: consumers’ environmental
awareness and end-of-pipe versus cleaner technology. To the best of our knowledge, we are the
first to analyze in a unified setting the relationship between green consumerism and the dilemma
of end-of-pipe versus cleaner technologies when consumers face a trade-off between the intrinsic
performance of a product and its environmental impact.
On the one hand, increasing attention has been paid to the impact of green consumerism
on market equilibrium. Most of this literature has focused on green high quality goods compet-
ing with brown low quality goods (Eriksson, 2004; Moraga-Gonzalez and Padron-Fumero 2002;
García-Gallego and Georgantzís, 2009; Ben Elhadj and Tarola, 2015, inter alia). Considering again
the automotive sector, Tesla or Lexus produce vehicles that combine remarkable performance and
environmental sustainability. Other examples can be found in sectors such as organic food (White-
wave Foods), fair trade certified clothing (Patagonia), and energy-saving devices (energy-efficient
light bulbs), where high hedonic quality standards are achieved in combination with environmental
quality.6 Nonetheless, the case of a conflict between performance and environmental attribute has
recently received increasing attention (Conrad, 2005; Mantovani et al., 2016, inter alia).7 We are in
line with these last works, which cover situations such as recycled paper vs. paper produced from
trees (that is often preferred because it is softer to the touch), recycled vs. virgin plastic (that is
more pliable to process), new generation washing machines’ energy saving cycles labeled "green"
or "eco" vs. ordinary cycles (that are less time consuming).
On the other hand, a large debate has focused on which type of green R&D activity should
be carried out by producers, and which policies should be adopted to incentivize the adoption of
green technologies (Montero, 2002; Requate and Unold, 2003; Requate, 2005, inter alia). Once
again, mainstream contributions assume that the high quality good is also green, and this is the
result of different forms of R&D activities. In Arora and Gangopadhyay (1995), Moraga-Gonzales
and Padron-Fumero (2002) and Bansal and Gangopadhyay (2003) firms invest to increase the
environmental quality of a product. Quality improvements require fixed setup costs. Differently
from our model, however, consumers do not incorporate in their utility function the impact of
pollution emissions. In Amacher et al. (2004) and Lombardini-Riipinen (2005), environmental
6 In general, B-corps aim to achieve a high performance while still maintaining a commitment to environmental
sustainability and protection. Visit: https://www.bcorporation.net/.
7Deltas et al. (2013) consider different attributes of a good in a duopoly where products differ both vertically (in
terms of their “greenness”) and horizontally (e.g., design, style, brand, and convenience).
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quality refers to the cleanness of production, and abatement efforts affect the variable costs. A
common objective of these papers is to study different forms of policy interventions in support of
green production. We abstract from policy instruments as we focus on the incentive on how to "go
green" in presence of a social component of consumption which contrasts the vertical attribute of a
product.8 To a certain degree, our paper can be related to endogenous mechanisms that drive firms
to adopt green technologies. André et al. (2009) and Lambertini and Tampieri (2012) use a vertical
differentiation model with environmental qualities to support the Porter hypothesis, showing that
firms may adopt green technologies even in absence of regulation.9
By explicitly considering how green consumerism affects the choice between end-of-pipe and
cleaner technologies, we relate our analysis to the branch of behavioral economics that extends
standard economic models based on the homo economicus in order to incorporate the formation of
pro-environmental behaviors coming from moral/social motivations (Brekke et al., 2003; Nyborg
et al., 2006; Manner and Gowdy, 2010; Owen and Videral, 2006; Turaga et al., 2010, inter alia)
or from "warm-glow" considerations (Andreoni, 1988 and 1990; Bergstrom, 1995, inter alia).10 We
share with this literature the argument that a pro-social behavior may be determined by the desire
to obtain a laudable social image, and that the effects of social image concerns increase with the
visibility of the activity (Benabou and Tirole, 2006; Andreoni and Bernheim 2009). Indeed, in our
approach, the pro-environmental behavior is a conspicuous practice and as such it is mainly driven
by a social component. In particular, we consider that the source of this component is a social norm
stating that protecting the environment is a byword for good citizenship. Following this view, we
assume that: (i) the social reward/punishment increases with the emissions differential between the
green and the brown variant, thus capturing the relative contribution of a consumer to the envi-
ronment; (ii) an exogenous parameter measures the strength of the social norm. Notice that, when
removing these social and/or "warm-glow" aspects of environmental concern, buying a green good
per se does not increase the utility of an environmentally concerned consumer. Typically, it is the
total demand of the green good that affects consumers’ utility by determining the amount of total
emissions. However, this would require a different framework entailing a network effect whereby the
utility from buying either good would depend on the number of consumers purchasing that good.
In so doing, the relative pull of dirty consumers would affect the social reward/punishment.11
We nest in our setting the choice between end-of-pipe and cleaner technologies, as we want to
investigate whether these relative preferences affect the profitability of one technology versus the
other. Contributions on this choice are mainly devoted to analyzing the impact of environmental
regulation on the decision of the producer regarding which green technology to adopt (Calel, 2011;
8Mantovani and Vergari (2017) consider the role of environmental campaign vs. taxation under relative preferences.
9According to the Porter hypothesis (Porter, 1990; Porter and van der Linde, 1995), environmental regulation,
instead of reducing profit opportunities, may induce firms to carry out new forms of innovative activities, ultimately
resulting in higher profits.
10The warm glow theory argues that people may help others in order to feel good about their contributions. Donors,
for example, may receive utility from the mere act of giving.
11For theoretical contributions on product differentiation and network effects, see Grilo et al. (2001) and Garcia
and Vergari (2016), among others.
6
Christin et al., 2013; Frondel et al., 2007; Johnstone et al., 2010, Nicolaï and Meunier, 2014).12
There is common agreement on two main findings. First of all, while regulation (such as pollution
taxes) has a positive and significant impact on investment in end-of-pipe measures, this does not
hold in the case of cleaner technologies (Frondel et al., 2007). The reason is that end-of-pipe
measures are easier to carry out in order to lower the burden of pollution taxes, given that they are
not integrated within the production process. Secondly, there is an increasing trend of investment
in cleaner technologies, and this is mainly observed in developed countries, as we stressed above (see
again Frondel et al., 2007). Since they change the whole production process, cleaner technologies are
somehow intended as a second step toward abatement effort, the first step being rather represented
by end-of-pipe measures.
Our results are in line with this evidence. We find that the adoption of cleaner technologies is
widespread in high-income countries, where the willingness to pay for quality is sufficiently high.
Also, we describe how a social driver contributes to solve the dilemma between end-of-pipe and
cleaner technology, thereby highlighting the role that can be played by consumers’ environmental
awareness rather than different forms of government intervention (such as taxes and pollution
permits). Incidentally, our position can be somehow reconciled with the idea that the choice of
end-of-pipe versus cleaner technologies can be explained by a mix of market-pull (i.e. a tendency to
prefer environmentally friendly products) and technology-push (i.e. subsidies) factors, with market-
pull factors being expected to be more important for investment in cleaner technologies than for
end-of-pipe measures (see Hemmelskamp, 1997).
Furthermore, by combining income levels and environmental awareness in order to describe
the incentive for producers to adopt green technologies, our paper relates to several studies that
attempted to evaluate the impact of economic growth on environmental commitment. In particular,
several studies have found an inverted-U relationship between economic growth and environmental
degradation. This relationship has been defined as the Environmental Kuznets Curve, and suggests
environmental degradation increases in the early stages of growth, and then decreases when income
reaches a certain point over the course of development (see, inter alia, Borghesi, 2001; Dinda, 2004,
2005). One of the factors highlighted by this view is that a higher level of income enables consumers
to develop a certain degree of environmental awareness, thus contributing to shifting production
toward more environmentally friendly activities. More recently, Schumacher (2015) explained how
environmental culture can induce this relationship in an overlapping generation model. Namely,
only "once society has reached a certain level of economic development, then it may optimally
invest a part of its wealth in developing an environmental culture", that in turn induces society to
improve environmental quality, "which again drives increases in environmental culture" (p. 201).
Somewhat in line with these studies, our results suggest that for high level of income and/or high
social awareness the more environmentally friendly technology choice prevails.
12A remarkable exception is Clemenz (2010), who analyzes the effect of eco-labels on polluting emissions in a model
with horizontal differentiation. He finds that the impact of eco-labels depends on the abatement effort undertaken
by firms: an efficient abatement level is more likely to be achieved with clean production than with end-of-pipe
technology.
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Finally, our analysis contributes to a large strand of the literature investigating the interplay
between environmental regulation and firms’ location. Even before the formulation of the pollution
haven hypothesis (Copeland and Taylor, 2004), this literature received ample attention from schol-
ars (see, among others, Markusen et al., 1993, 1995; Motta and Thisse 1994; Greaker, 2003). Some
of them focused on the optimal environmental policy within a given market structure (Bayindir-
Upmann, 2003; Kayalica and Lahiri, 2005; Cole et al., 2006), while others endogenized both location
and policy decisions under market symmetry (e.g. Petrakis and Xepapadeas, 2003; Ulph and Valen-
tini, 2001; Abe and Zhao, 2005; Ikefuji et al., 2015). Finally, a part of them developed the analysis
under the assumption of country asymmetry (Zeng and Zhao, 2009, Sanna-Randaccio and Sestini,
2012), or both country and firm heterogeneity (Sanna-Randaccio et al., 2016) with exogenous uni-
lateral climate policies. In our case, we do not focus on the effects of unilateral policies on firms’
location. However, we still analyze how the dilemma between end-of-pipe and cleaner technologies
is solved in the light of market features, such as income and environmental awareness. Thus, we
implicitly advance the hypothesis that country heterogeneity plays a role in the choice of abatement
effort and therefore, depending on the area where a firm decides to install its plant, the choice of
abatement changes. For example, we find that for a high level of income, or when the social com-
ponent is extremely significant, the investment in cleaner technologies is preferred over end-of-pipe.
In this view, our results thus contribute to highlight that market-pull factors can induce firms to
prefer cleaner technologies, in spite of their possibly high costs.
3 The Model
We consider two firms producing two vertically differentiated goods. Similarly to the models of
vertical differentiation (Mussa and Rosen, 1978), the performance of good i, with i = L,H, deter-
mines its intrinsic or hedonic quality qi with qH > qL. Nevertheless, good qi generates polluting
emissions per unit of production at some level ei = φqi. As a result, given that eL = φqL < eH ,
good H represents the brown good, whereas good L represents the green good. Still, variant L
is less polluting than variant H. We consider two possibilities for the green firm L to produce
the environmentally friendly good: either invest in cleaner or invest in end-of-pipe technologies
(Frondel et al., 2007).13 In line with the literature, we model cleaner technologies with variable
costs and end-of-pipe technologies with fixed costs (see, among others, Clemenz, 2010).
As far as the demand side is concerned, we consider a continuum of consumers indexed by θ and
uniformly distributed in the interval [0, b] with density 1/b. The parameter θ is proportional to the
WTP for intrinsic quality, so that b denotes the highest WTP for the performance of a product.
Typically, parameter b represents the highest level of income among consumers: the higher the
income, the higher the corresponding willingness to pay of consumers.14 The indirect utility of
13We assume without loss of generality that it is firm L to undertake abatement effort. We shall discuss briefly
later how our main findings would change under the alternative assumption that it is firm H to carry out abatement
efforts.
14See for example Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) and Shaked and Sutton (1982).
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consumer type θ writes as:
U (θ) =

θqH − pH − γ (eH − eL) , if she buys the high quality good,
θqL − pL + γ (eH − eL) , if she buys the low quality good,
0, if she refrains from buying.
(1)
The utility from consumption depends on both the variant’s hedonic quality qi and the emissions
gap between variants. This latter component, i.e. γ (eH − eL), captures the idea that the variants
are perceived as positional goods. Therefore, they are considered by consumers in terms of relative
instead of absolute emissions. For the sake of simplicity and without any loss of generality, we can
assume that φ = 1, so that (eH − eL) = (qH − qL).15 So, these emissions fix the relative position
of a variant along an environmental quality ladder and thus determine the corresponding social
position of consumers along the social ladder.16
Accordingly, although the quality is unidimensional and hedonic, each consumer incorporates
the emission differential in its surplus function due to the social component of consumption. Para-
meter γ ≥ 0 measures the intensity of this relative dimension of consumption, namely the strength
of the social norm inducing a pro-social (and green) behavior.17 Following Litina et al. (2016),
we assume that social norms are uniformly interiorized by the citizens living in the same country.
The rationale supporting this view is that a community shares the same set of cultural values
and beliefs (Dietz et al., 2005; Steg and de Groot, 2012) and thus expresses the same willingness
to comply with a social norm. This assumption implies that, for each given level of γ, someone
with high income appreciates relatively less a good with high environmental concern. Indeed, we
advance the idea that whenever people attribute a very high value to the hedonic component, they
are less prompt to sacrifice the consumption of a product with a very high performance because it
is polluting. They do not accept the environmentally friendly nature of a good as a compensation
for a poor performance.18
From the above formulation of the utility function, the consumer indifferent between buying
the low quality good and not buying at all, and the one indifferent between buying the low quality
15We could consider a generic φ > 0 without normalizing φ to 1. However, this would not bring any further insight
to the model while making the analysis extremely cumbersome.
16See Ben Elhadi et al. (2015) for an in-depth discussion of this formalization. An alternative way to model
the utility function would be relating the satisfaction of an individual when consuming a hedonic quality variant
with its absolute environmental quality. In this latter formulation however, the status or positional content of green
consumption would not be captured.
17The higher the value of γ, the stronger the relative (or social) preferences with respect to the hedonic ones. The
extreme case γ = 0 reduces the model to the traditional vertical differentiation framework with hedonic preferences
as unique driver for consumption.
18Of course, this trade-off does not arise when a good is simultaneously of high hedonic quality and green. In this
case, consumers can satisfy their desire to comply with a social norm while consuming a high hedonic quality product.
Notice that a good satisfying simultaneously both the hedonic and the social requirements provide consumers with a
higher surplus than the alternative one, even if people are not interested in one of the two requirements.
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good and the high quality good, are respectively given by:
θL =
pL − γ(qH − qL)
qL
, (2)
θH =
2γ(qH − qL) + pH − pL
qH − qL . (3)
The demand functions faced by firms L and H are easily derived:
xL =
1
b
(θH −max{θL, 0})
=

1
b

pHqL − qHpL + γ (qH + qL) (qH − qL)
qL (qH − qL)

if γ <
pL
qH − qL ,
1
b

2γ +
pH − pL
qH − qL

if γ ≥ pL
qH − qL .
(4)
xH =
1
b
(b− θH) = 1
b

b−

2γ +
pH − pL
qH − qL

, (5)
As for the supply side, we assume that either firm can produce only one type of product,
intended as a combination of the two attributes (hedonic quality and emissions): this captures the
idea that it is costly and time-consuming for a firm to go green.19 For example, the switch to solar
power requires the installation of solar panels on business facilities. Moreover, the cost reductions
in energy savings are not always enough to counterbalance the conversion costs, at least in the short
run. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the production choice is irreversible: each firm i
produces the variant qi, corresponding to a given hedonic and environmental attributes. Further,
we assume that production costs are positive only for the green good, whereas the brown quality
is produced at zero cost. Formally, profit functions of firms H and L respectively write as:
πH = xH · pH , (6)
πL =
	
(pL − c)xL under cleaner production
xL · pL − F under end-of-pipe production
, (7)
where c > 0 is the per-unit cost in case of cleaner technology, whereas F is the fixed cost in case
of end-of-the-pipe technology. This cost specification, despite its simplicity, enables us to address
the question of whether a green firm is more willing to invest in cleaner production rather than in
end-of-pipe technologies in the presence of moral/social incentive to pro-environmental behavior.
4 The equilibrium analysis
Typically, in a traditional vertically differentiated duopoly market in which the lowest WTP for
quality is zero, firms never end up covering the market at equilibrium. However, in this framework,
19We also focus on the case in which firms produce different qualities so as to exclude that price competition leads
to a Bertrand paradox.
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characterized by relative preferences, we can identify the conditions for which the market is covered
at the limit. In particular, this happens when the intensity of relative preferences is sufficiently
strong. In Mantovani et al. (2016) we characterize the parametric region where this happens for
the case of cleaner technology; in the following analysis we add those for the end-of-pipe technology.
It is also possible to show that the green (resp., brown) firm can monopolize the market when
the intensity of relative preferences is extremely high (resp., low). However, for the purpose of
the present paper, we limit our analysis to the case in which both producers are active in the
market.20 In particular, we consider two market configurations: duopoly with uncovered market
and duopoly with covered market. This enables us to analyze the key role of competition on the
green firm’s decision between cleaner and end-of-pipe technology. Without loss of generality, we
limit the analysis to the case where the quality ratio is such that qH/qL ∈ (1, 2), but the results can
be easily generalized to account for each quality specification qH > qL.
21 In the following analysis
we distinguish our equilibrium results according to the type of green technology adopted by the
firm.
4.1 Cleaner technology
In case of cleaner technology, the environmentally friendly firm incurs in a per-unit cost disadvantage
equal to c, given that the production cost for the brown producer is assumed to be zero. Sufficient
but not necessary conditions for the duopoly equilibria (both uncovered and covered) to hold are
summarized in Lemma 1. Necessary conditions are specified in Appendix A but they are not used
throughout the paper in order to simplify the exposition of our results. This is without loss of
generality, as one can easily prove. Let us define:

b ≡ cqH
(qH − qL)2
,
γ ≡ c (2qH − qL)− bqL (qH − qL)
2qH(qH − qL) ,

γ ≡ 2cqH + b (qH − qL) qL
(2qH − qL) (qH − qL) .
Lemma 1 Provided b > 
b, θL < θH < b so that both firms are active in the market when
γ ∈ [max{0, γ}, b). The duopoly is sustained by an interior equilibrium for γ ∈ [max{0, γ}, 
γ),
while it is sustained by a corner equilibrium with market coverage for γ ∈ [
γ, b).
Proof. See Appendix A.
20Additional calculations and formal demonstrations are available upon request. In Mantovani et al. (2016) we
characterize such conditions for the case of cleaner technology, identifying the parametric regions where a monopoly
(either green or brown) may occur at equilibrium.
21 In the next subsections we will characterize the parametric regions in which a duopoly scenario holds, both for
the case of cleaner and for the case of end-of-the-pine technology. Assuming qH/qL ≥ 2 would imply considering other
relevant threshold values for γ and b, given that some of our conditions require different threshold values precisely
when qH/qL ≥ 2. However, given that the qualitative results of our paper are unaffected by the quality ratio that we
adopt, we decided to focus on the case qH/qL ∈ (1, 2) . Additional calculations are available upon request.
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Under cleaner production, price competition leads to the following equilibrium profits in the
uncovered market equilibrium (superscript C stands for Cleaner):
πCL =
qH [(qH − qL) (2γqH + bqL)− c(2qH − qL)]2
bqL (qH − qL) (4qH − qL)2 , (8)
πCH =
{cqH + (qH − qL) [2bqH − γ(3qH − qL)]}2
b (qH − qL) (4qH − qL)2 . (9)
As for the covered market equilibrium (additional superscript cov indicates a covered market):
πCcovL =
(b+ γ) [γ(qH − qL)− c]
2b
, (10)
πCcovH =
(b− γ)2 (qH − qL)
4b
. (11)
Equilibrium profits in both cases are obviously positive under Lemma 1. Equilibrium prices and
demands for both cases are reported in Appendix A and indicated with pCi and x
C
i for the uncovered
case and with pCcovi and x
Ccov
i for the covered case, respectively, with i = L,H. Although important
for the following analysis, we decided not to report their precise expressions in the main text in
order to focus only on the most important calculations, which will focus on profits’ comparisons.
4.2 End-of-pipe technology
In case of end-of-the-pipe technologies, there is a fixed cost disadvantage for the green firm as
variable costs are assumed to be zero for both firms. We focus again on sufficient but not necessary
conditions for both the uncovered and the covered duopoly to be sustained at equilibrium. Necessary
conditions are reported in Appendix B but they are again neglected in the formal analysis for
expository purposes. Let us define:

b′ ≡ F (2qH − qL)2
qHqL(qH − qL) ,
γ′ ≡ (4qH − qL)

FbqHqL(qH − qL)− bqHqL(qH − qL)
2q2H(qH − qL)
,

γ′ ≡ bqL
2qH − qL .
Lemma 2 Provided b > 
b′, θL < θH < b and both firms are active in the market when γ ∈
[max{0, γ′}, b). The duopoly is sustained by an interior equilibrium for γ ∈ [max{0, γ′}, 
γ′}),
while it is sustained by a corner equilibrium with market coverage for γ ∈ [
γ′, b).
Proof. See Appendix B.
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Under end-of-pipe production technologies, equilibrium profits in the uncovered market equi-
librium are (superscript E stands for end-of-pipe):
πEL =
qH (qH − qL) (bqL + 2γqH)2
bqL (4qH − qL)2
− F, (12)
πEH =
(qH − qL) (2bqH − 3γqH + γqL)2
b (4qH − qL)2
. (13)
They are obviously positive under the conditions specified in Lemma 2. Equilibrium prices and
demands for the uncovered case are indicated with pEi and x
E
i , i = L,H. Their precise expressions
are reported in Appendix B.
As for the covered market equilibrium, prices and demands are the same as under cleaner
production: pEcovi = p
Ccov
i and x
Ecov
i = x
Ccov
i , i = L,H. Equilibrium profit for the brown producer
do not change (πEcovH = π
Ccov
H ) while that of the green firm is given by:
πEcovL =
γ (b+ γ) (qH − qL)
2b
− F, (14)
and it is positive under Lemma 2.
Before proceeding to the formal comparison between the two technologies, notice that in both
scenarios the market is covered for sufficiently high values of γ. In other words, when the social
component of consumption is perceived as extremely relevant, the green firm gains consumers both
at the expense of the brown rival (θH shifts to the right) and among those who previously decided
not to buy the product (θL shifts to the left). Our conditions for a covered duopoly market guarantee
that θL = 0 but at the same time θH < b, otherwise the brown producer would be induced to exit
from the market.
5 Cleaner versus end-of-pipe technology
Imagine a preliminary stage of the price game in which the firm that goes green can choose between
cleaner and end-of-the-pipe technology. Which one is it going to adopt? And what is the potential
role of social preferences and income in affecting such a decision? We are aware that the relative
cost of the two technologies plays an important role, but we want to study what happens when
such cost difference is not the primary driver of the decision.
Let us now proceed by assessing whether the green firm is more willing to invest in cleaner
rather than in end-of-pipe technologies in the two market configurations. First of all, we need to
find the precise parametric regions in which both firms are active at equilibrium under both green
efforts. Considering the conditions appearing in Lemmas 1 and 2, it follows that:
Lemma 3 Provided b > max{
b,
b′}, an uncovered duopoly can be sustained at equilibrium under
both technologies when γ ∈ [max{0, γ, γ′}, 
γ′), while a covered duopoly can be sustained at
equilibrium under both technologies when γ ∈ [
γ, b). For γ ∈ [
γ′, 
γ), the equilibrium would
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result in an uncovered duopoly under cleaner technology and in a covered duopoly under
end-of-pipe technology.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Figure 1 reproduces the parametric regions described in Lemma 3, under the assumptions that
qH = 1.5, qL = 1 , and that F is sufficiently high with respect to c so that γ
′ > γ and 
b > 
b′.22
The shaded area in the south-east portion of the figure represents the region where γ ≥ b, while
the dotted area in the south-west portion illustrates the case in which γ < max{0, γ, γ′}. The
former area is characterized by an equilibrium in which only the green firm is active in the market,
given the strong intensity of relative preferences. On the contrary, in the latter area the green firm
cannot survive at equilibrium, because the cost that it has to pay to become green is too high in
comparison with the (very) weak combination between the WTP for quality and the degree of the
moral/social motivation for consumption.23
Figure 1: Parametric regions sustaining duopoly at equilibrium
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Consider first the (sub)set of relevant parameters where an uncovered duopoly arises at equilib-
rium with both end-of-pipe and cleaner technology. This corresponds to area A in Figure 1, which
22Following the calculations reported in Appendix C, this holds when F > F0. This is without loss of generality,
as a similar representation would have resulted for lower values of F . The only relevant change in the graphic would
have been the fact that γ′ < γ (F ≤ F0) and that eventually also b < b
′ for very low values of F (F < F1 < F0).
23 In Mantovani et al. (2016) the interested reader can find detailed information on the characterization of the all
the possible equilibria appearing for the case of cleaner production. Additional information can be provided for the
case of end-of-pipe investment effort.
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is characterized by the condition γ ∈ [max{0, γ, γ′}, 
γ′). Comparing equilibrium profits we find:
πCL − πEL = F − cqH (2qH − qL)
× 4qH (qH − qL)γ − c (2qH − qL) + 2bqL (qH − qL)
bqL (qH − qL) (4qH − qL)2
. (15)
It is immediate to prove that for very low values of F with respect to c (think of F → 0, for
example), then end-of-pipe would be always preferred by the green producer. The opposite would
result, mutatis mutandis, for a very high value of F relatively to the value of c. The most interesting
situations occur therefore for intermediate values of F with respect to c. In particular,
πCL − πEL  0
⇔ b  cqH (2qH − qL) [4qH (qH − qL) γ − c (2qH − qL)]
qL (qH − qL) [F (4qH − qL)2 − 2cqH (2qH − qL)]
≡ bF . (16)
However, bF is compatible with γ ∈ [max{0, γ, γ′}, 
γ′) when F ∈ [F1, F2), where the precise value
of F1 is reported in Appendix C, and
F2 =
2bqL(4q
2
H − 5qHqL + q2L)− c (2qH − qL)2
bqL (qH − qL) (4qH − qL)2
.
We can therefore state the following:
Proposition 1 In an uncovered duopoly, when F ∈ [F1, F2), the green firm prefers to invest in
cleaner (resp. end-of-pipe) technology when b > bF (resp. b ≤ bF ) .
Proof. Directly follows from previous discussion. In particular, it is relatively easy to demon-
strate that F2 > F1 when b > max{
b,
b′}.
Consider next the (sub)set of relevant parameters where a covered duopoly arises at equilibrium
with both end-of-pipe technologies and cleaner production. This corresponds to area C in Figure
1, where γ ∈ [
γ, b). Comparing relevant equilibrium profits, we obtain:
πCcovL − πEcovL = F −
c(b+ γ)
2b
. (17)
Obviously, given b and γ, if F is sufficiently high with respect to c, then cleaner technology always
prevails, and the opposite when F is low enough. For intermediate values of F , we find that:
πCcovL − πEcovL  0⇔ b 
cγ
(2F − c) ≡ b
cov. (18)
The threshold value bcov is compatible with γ ∈ [
γ, b) when F ∈ [F3, c), where,
F3 =
cqH [c+ b (qH − qL)]
b (qH − qL) (2qH − qL) .
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To sum up, we can state that:
Proposition 2 In a covered duopoly, when F ∈ [F3, c), the green firm prefers to invest in cleaner
(resp. end-of-pipe) technology when b > bcov (resp. b ≤ bcov).
Proof. Directly follows from previous discussion. In particular, it is immediate to demonstrate
that F3 < c when b > max{
b,
b′}.
Propositions 1 and 2 reveal that a firm that decides to adopt a green technology prefers to
(unilaterally) invest in cleaner rather than in end-of-pipe solutions when the average WTP for
quality in the market is sufficiently high. The intuition is as follows: the adoption of cleaner
technology, that entails a variable cost disadvantage and in turn it raises the equilibrium prices,
is discouraged by tough competition - that is for low values of parameter b. In other words, the
incentive for the green firm to invest in cleaner technologies increases with the average income,
which softens competitive pressure. Thus, in high-income countries (regions), the incentive to
invest in the production process dominates the incentive to undertake add-on-measures.
Even though we restricted our analysis to the range of γ and b parameters where either an
uncovered or a covered market arises at equilibrium with both technology choices (respectively
Areas A and C in Figure 1), our results also hold in Area B. In other words, when γ ∈ [
γ′, 
γ),
we obtain a b-threshold value such that cleaner (resp. end-of-pipe) dominates end-of-pipe (resp.
cleaner) technologies when b is above (resp. below) this threshold.24
Let us now consider how the incentive to invest in cleaner versus end-of-pipe technology changes
with the market coverage. We find that:
Proposition 3 For high (resp. low) values of b, the investment in cleaner technologies (resp. end-
of-pipe) is unambiguously preferred over end-of-pipe (resp. cleaner) technologies. For intermediate
values of b, whenever the quality gap is low (resp. high), then investing in cleaner technologies can
be observed only in the uncovered (resp. covered) market.
Proof. see Appendix D.
The rationale underlying the above Proposition can be explained as follows. When facing the
dilemma between investing in cleaner or end-of pipe technologies, the green firm takes into account
two drivers: a price competition driver and a social driver. These two drivers have to be read by
considering the basic difference between these two abatement efforts: while investing in cleaner
technologies entails a variable cost disadvantage thereby raising the equilibrium price, end-of-pipe
measures do not affect directly the equilibrium price since they entail a fixed cost. Accordingly, the
former investment can be preferred over the latter as long as the firm can benefit from a high WTP
for quality. An investment in cleaner technologies is indeed stifled by the price competition driver
given that competitive pressure reduces equilibrium prices, while it is spurred by the social driver
as this increases the WTP for the green good. The price competition driver prevails for extreme
values of b, regardless of the market coverage (this is the same intuition behind Proposition 1 and
24Additional calculations are available upon request.
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2). This explains why end-of-pipe technologies are adopted for low values of b, whereas cleaner
production is preferred when b is high enough. For intermediate values of b, the balance of these
contrasting drivers is ambiguous. The social driver is stronger the larger is the social component of
consumption (γ (qH − qL)), that is the higher is the intensity of the relative preferences (γ) and/or
the higher is the quality gap (qH − qL). The competition driver is more significant, in a covered
market, where the equilibrium market shares react more strongly to a price change than in the
uncovered market. Since the covered market is characterized by values of γ which are higher than
in the uncovered market, on one hand competition is tougher, but on the other hand the intensity
of social preferences becomes more relevant in the covered than in the uncovered market. Thus, the
choice between cleaner versus end-of pipe technologies depends on whether the competition driver
— inducing the green firm to invest in cleaner technologies in the uncovered market — dominates
(or is dominated by) the social driver — leading the green firm to undertake this investment in the
covered market. Whenever the quality gap is not very relevant, the competition driver prevails
so the green firm undertakes an investment in cleaner technologies in the uncovered market, while
preferring to invest in end-of-pipe under market coverage. On the contrary, when the quality gap is
relevant, the social driver prevails so the investment in cleaner technologies takes place only in the
covered market where the increase in price due to the variable cost does not penalize significantly
the green firm in terms of market share.25
Finally, let us briefly consider how these findings are related to the assumption that it is firm
L to undertake the abatement effort. To this aim, let us focus on the alternative assumption
that it is firm H to invest in abatement. Then, firm H would produce a variant that is of higher
quality along both hedonic and environmental dimensions. In this case, the conflict between the
price competition and the social drivers would not arise since both of them would lead to the
same type of investment. Indeed, the willingness to pay for hedonic quality would be magnified
by the existence of social preferences, so that a high value of b and/or γ would induce firm H to
prefer cleaner technologies over end-of-pipe measures. Then, as an immediate consequence, firm H
would favor cleaner production for high values of b, while it would prefer to invest in end-of-pipe
technologies in the opposite case. The range of b−parameters for which cleaner technologies are
preferred becomes larger (resp. smaller), the higher (resp. lower) the value of γ.
6 Conclusions
We have analyzed the role of price competition in the technological choice between cleaner and
end-of-pipe abatement efforts in the presence of consumers that show a certain degree of environ-
mental concern when purchasing products. We have provided a stylized model in which we have
abstracted from regulatory measures in order to focus on alternative market-driven drivers of en-
vironmental innovation. In particular, we have introduced a pro-environmental component into a
25 It is worth remarking that in the covered duopoly, the intensity of social preferences is such that a price switch
emerges and, in spite of its lower hedonic quality, the price of the green variant turns out to be higher than the price
of the brown good.
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vertically differentiated model in which consumers value the intrinsic quality of a certain product.
This was done by resorting to the theory of relative preferences, which combines sociological and
psychological aspects to explain consumers’ purchasing decisions for products which provide some
moral gratification in addition to satisfy material needs.
We have found that the interplay between the intensity of market competition, the level of
consumers’ income disparity, and their degree of environmental concern plays a key role in the
technological choice of the green producer. A simple prescription arises: the adoption of cleaner
production, that entails a variable cost disadvantage for the environmental friendly firm with respect
to the brown firm, can be discouraged by a low average WTP for quality in the market (low average
income) and by tough competition, while it can be spurred by the moral/social incentive to pro-
environmental behavior.
Our analysis is in line with the objectives of different initiatives that have been recently sup-
ported in order to increase the pro-active role of consumers in affecting environmental strategies.
As reported in Future Earth 2025, one of the key focal challenges is to "encourage sustainable
consumption and production patterns that are equitable by understanding the social and environ-
mental impacts of consumption of all resources, opportunities for decoupling resource use from
growth in well-being, and options for sustainable development pathways and related changes in
human behavior."26 An in-depth analysis of this issue from an empirical viewpoint is left for future
research.
APPENDIX A
Consider as a starting point an uncovered market in which both firms are active. Demands are
defined as xL = (θH − θL) /b and xH = (b− θH) /b, and profit functions are given by πH = xH · pH
and πL = (pL − c)xL. Equilibrium prices can be easily obtained:
pCL =
2cqH + (qH − qL) (2γqH + bqL)
4qH − qL ,
pCH =
cqH + (qH − qL) [2bqH − γ(3qH − qL)]
4qH − qL ,
where additional superscript C indicates Cleaner (technology), as we also specified in the main
text. First, we verify that:
pCL ≥ c ⇐⇒ γ ≥
c (2qH − qL)− bqL (qH − qL)
2qH(qH − qL) ≡ γ,
pCH ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ γ ≤
qH [2b(qH − qL) + c]
(qL − 3qH) (qL − qH) ≡ γ,
26For more information, please visit http://www.futureearth.org/news/future-earth-2025-vision-sets-framework-
programmes-contribution-global-sustainable-development
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with
γ > 0 ⇐⇒ b < b0 ≡ c (2qH − qL)
qL (qH − qL) ,
γ > γ ⇐⇒ b > b ≡ c
(qH + qL)
,
and b0 > b. Moreover, we have to demonstrate that the market is uncovered, i.e. 0 < θL < θH < b.
By substituting pCL and p
C
H into (2) and (3), we obtain θ
C
H and θ
C
L and the following conditions:
θCH ≤ b ⇐⇒ γ ≤ γ, θCL ≤ θCH ⇐⇒ γ ≥ γ,
θCL ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ γ ≤ 
γ ≡ 2cqH + b (qH − qL) qL(2qH − qL) (qH − qL) ,
where the precise values of θCL and θ
C
H are available upon request. Moreover, observe that:

γ > γ ⇐⇒ b < 
b ≡ cqH
(qH − qL)2
, with 
b > b.
By considering b > 
b, threshold values γ and b become irrelevant. This explains the parametric
restriction adopted in Lemma 1 for the uncovered market that ensures that 0 < θCL < θ
C
H < b.
Equilibrium demands are as follows:
xCL =
qH [(qH − qL) (2γqH + bqL)− c (2qH − qL)]
bqL(4qH − qL) (qH − qL) ,
xCH =
cqH + (qH − qL) [2bqH − γ (3qH − qL)]
b(4qH − qL) (qH − qL) ,
while equilibrium profits are reported in the main text.
Now consider what happens for γ ≥ 
γ, which is indeed possible only when b ≥ 
b. The result
is θCL ≤ 0, and therefore the market is covered. An interior duopoly solution with covered market
cannot be sustained at equilibrium, as it can be easily verified. In such a case, therefore, a duopoly
with the market covered at the limit becomes the unique equilibrium candidate. This equilibrium
configuration is characterized by constrained price competition. As the market is covered at the
limit, the indifferent consumer θL defined in (2) is set equal to zero, and demand functions are
xL = θH/b and xH = (b − θH)/b. Accordingly, the equilibrium price of the green good is given
by pCcovL = γ (qH − qL) > c . Additional specification cov defines equilibrium variables in case of
covered market. Inserting pCcovL into the best reply of the high quality firm and solving, we obtain
pCcovH = (b− γ) (qH − qL) /2 > 0 iff γ < b. Hence, when γ ≥ 
γ, there is still room for both
producers and the market is covered at the limit only when γ < b. Equilibrium demands are given
by xCcovL = (b+ γ) /2b and x
Ccov
H = (b− γ) /2b; equilibrium profits are provided in the main text.
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We start by assuming that both firms are active in an uncovered market. Demands are then
defined as xL = (θH − θL) /b and xH = (b− θH) /b with θL and θH defined in the main text. The
pair of candidate equilibrium prices can be easily obtained:
pEL =
(qH − qL) (2γqH + bqL)
4qH − qL > 0,
pEH =
(qH − qL) [2bqH − γ(3qH − qL)]
4qH − qL .
where superscript E denotes the equilibrium value obtained under end-of-the-pipe technology. In
order for the duopoly to hold at equilibrium, the following conditions must simultaneously hold:
πEL ≥ 0
⇐⇒ γ ≥ (4qH − qL)

FbqHqL(qH − qL)− bqHqL(qH − qL)
2q2H(qH − qL)
≡ γ′,
pEH ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ γ ≤
2bqH
(qL − 3qH) ≡ γ
′,
with:
γ′ > 0 ⇐⇒ b < b′0 ≡
F (4qH − qL)2
qHqL (qH − qL) ,
γ′ > γ′ ⇐⇒ b > b′ ≡ FqL (3qH − qL)
2
qH (qH − qL) (qH + qL)2 ,
and b′0 > b
′. We also need to demonstrate that the market is uncovered, and that both goods have
positive demands, i.e. 0 < θL < θH < b. By substituting p
E
L and p
E
H into (2) and (3) we obtain θ
E
L
and θEH and the following conditions:
θEH ≤ b ⇐⇒ γ ≤ γ′; θEL ≤ θEH always;
θEL ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ γ ≤ 
γ′ ≡ bqL2qH − qL .
The precise values of θEL and θ
E
H are available upon request. For every value of b, notice that 
γ′ < γ′
when qH/qL ∈ (1, 2). For this reason, we can neglect γ′ from the relevant set of threshold values.
Moreover, observe that

γ′ > γ′ ⇔ b > F (2qH − qL)2
qHqL(qH − qL) ≡

b′, with 
b′ < b′0.
Hence, in b > 
b′ the duopoly is sustained by an interior equilibrium when γ ∈ [max{0, γ′}, 
γ′), given
that 0 < θEL < θ
E
H < b. Equilibrium demands are:
xEL =
qH(2γqH + bqL)
bqL(4qH − qL) , x
E
H =
2bqH − γ (3qH − qL)
b(4qH − qL) ,
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while equilibrium profits are reported in the text.
Consider now what happens when γ ≥ 
γ′. This implies that θEL ≤ 0; the equilibrium candidate
is a duopoly with the market covered at the limit. By imposing θL = 0, demand functions become
xL = θH/b and xH = (b− θH)/b. Equilibrium prices are the same as under cleaner production, i.e.
pEcovL = p
Ccov
L > 0 and p
Ecov
H = p
Ccov
H > 0 ⇐⇒ γ < b, with b > 
γ′. Also equilibrium demands do
not vary: xEcovL = x
Ccov
L and x
Ecov
H = x
Ccov
H . Hence, the equilibrium profit for the brown producer
remains the same: πEcovH = π
Ccov
H . The profit of the green firms is instead modified, and it results
in:
πEcovL =
γ (b+ γ) (qH − qL)
2b
− F ≥ 0
⇐⇒ γ ≥
√
b

8F + b(qH − qL)
2

(qH − qL)
− b
2
≡ γ′′,

γ′ > γ′′ ⇐⇒ b > b1, and
b > γ′′ ⇐⇒ b >
√
F (2qH − qL)
qHqL(qH − qL)
≡ b2, with b2 < b1.
However, given that 
b′ > b1(> b2), we can exclude parameter γ′′ from the relevant set of threshold
values. It follows that a corner duopoly equilibrium with covered market appears in γ ∈ [
γ′, b).
APPENDIX C
On the one hand, we obtain that:

b−
b′  0⇔ F  cqHqL
(qH − qL)(2qH − qL)2 ≡ F0,
γ′ − γ  0⇔ F  c
2qH (2qH − qL)2
bqL (qH − qL) (4qH − qL)2
≡ F1,
with F0 > F1 in b > max{
b,
b′}. Hence, the comparisons between 
b and 
b′ and between γ and γ′
depends of the relative intensity of F versus c. On the other hand, it is immediate to prove that
γ′ < 
γ for each c > 0, given that lim
c→0

γ = 
γ′.
APPENDIX D
First, consider the conditions under which these b-thresholds are positive: bcov = cγ(2F−c) >
0 ⇐⇒ Fc > 12 . Given that Fc > 12 , the denominator of bF is positive (as
1
2
>
2qH (2qH − qL)
(4qH − qL)2
),
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then bF > 0 ⇐⇒ 4qH (qH − qL) γ > c (2qH − qL). Comparing the two b-thresholds we find that:
bF − bcov
=
cqH (2qH − qL) [4qH (qH − qL)γ − c (2qH − qL)]
qL (qH − qL) [(4qH − qL)2 F − 2cqH (2qH − qL)]
− cγ
(2F − c) .
While bcov does not depend on qH/qL, we show that b
F is increasing in qH , given qL, in the relevant
range of parameters qH/qL ∈]1, 2]. To this aim, without loss of generality, let us normalize qL to
one. Then,
∂bF
∂qH
> 0.
Indeed, ∂bF /∂qH is a polynomial with 4 terms:
∂bF
∂qH
=

(2qH − 1) (4qH − 1)
−2qH + 4q2H + 1Fc  
A
− 2q2H (2qH − 1)2 c2  
B
+

8γqH (4qH − 1)
−3qH + 4q2H + 1 (qH − 1)2F  
D
+

−8γq2H (2qH − 1)2 (qH − 1)2

c  
G
Since A − B > 0 and D − G > 0, then it follows that ∂bF /∂qH > 0. Notice also that there
exists a value of qH , say q
◦
H , with q
◦
H =
1
4γ

c+ 2γ +

4γ2 + c2

, such that bF (q
◦
H) = 0. Thus, it
immediately follows that there exists a value of qH , say q˜H , such that b
F (q˜H) = b
cov(q˜H) for any
qH < q˜H then b
F < bcov, while bF ≥ bcov otherwise namely for any qH ≥ q˜H .
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